Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design


Cambridge University Press






15 a 20 dias

Descrição não disponível.
Preface; Part I. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction: 1. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction; 2. An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction; 3. The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions; 4. Measuring the efficiency of an FCC spectrum auction; Part II. The Combinatorial Clock Auction Formats: 5. Combinatorial auction design; 6. The clock-proxy auction: a practical combinatorial auction design; 7. Spectrum auction design; 8. A practical guide to the combinatorial clock auction; 9. Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction; 10. Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions; 11. Core-selecting package auctions; 12. A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions; 13. On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions; 14. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders; 15. Properties of the combinatorial clock auction; 16. Budget constraints combinatorial clock auctions; 17. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions: about inconsistent bidding and its impact on efficiency in the combinatorial clock auction; Part III. Alternative Auction Designs: 18. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation; 19. A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions; 20. Hierarchical package bidding: a paper and pencil combinatorial auction; 21. Assignment messages and exchanges; 22. The product-mix auction: a new auction design for differentiated goods; 23. The continuous combinatorial auction architecture; 24. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions; Part IV. Experimental Comparisons of Auction Designs: 25. Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms; 26. Laboratory experimental testbeds: application to the PCS auction; 27. An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats; 28. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design; 29. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs; 30. Spectrum auction design: simple auctions for complex sales; Part V. The Bidders' Perspective: 31. Winning play in spectrum auctions; 32. Up in the air: GTE's experience in the MTA auction for personal communication services licenses; 33. Bidding complexities in the combinatorial clock auction; 34. Strategic bidding in combinatorial clock auctions - a bidder perspective; 35. Impact of budget-contraints on the efficiency of multi-lot spectrum auctions; Part VI. Secondary Markets and Exchanges: 36. Spectrum markets: motivation, challenges, and implications; 37. Designing the US incentive auction; 38. Solving the station repacking problem; 39. ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange; 40. ACE: a combinatorial market mechanism; Outlook.
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.